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Casey Charles

Making Justice:
Same-Sex Partnership
in the Kowalski Case

If you don't like the news, go out and make some
of your own.
(Stephan Ponic, KSAN Radio, 1969)
... this recognition of our limitation and contingency, of the precarious and pragmatic construction of the universality of our values ... is the
very condition for a democratic society. To
reformulate the values of the Enlightenment in
the direction of a radical historicism and to
renounce its rationalistic epistemological and
ontological foundations, then, is to expand the
democratic potentialities of that tradition ...
(Laclau, 1990, 83)
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rom Aristotle to Rawls, theorists have traditionally associated the concept of justice with a transcendent
ideal of fairness, equity, and reason. 1 Blindfolded, Justice sits on a raised dais holding her balanced scales,
truths and judgments emanating from the oak-paneled
chambers of her hallowed halls, architecturally, linguistically, and socially separated from a removed populace. Yet for radical democrats like Ernesto Laclau, the
tendency to conceive and implement political values
like justice within a framework that treats them as universal and immutable has dangerous socio-political
consequences. Theorizing justice as an all-encompassing, immanent ideal obfuscates the socially and historically constructed nature of justice, undermining its status as an often arbitrary or contingent adjudication
that is dependent upon a network of social forces. Em-
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phasis on such a metaphysical conception also perpetuates the idea
that justice is immanent, self-evident, and transhistorical (see
Goodrich 1987). These notions, in turn, tend to impede the implementation of justice within a pragmatic politics that recognizes it not
:15 an elusive abstraction occasionally approximated by an arcane and
1~s~ar web of political theorists, but as a malleable, historically-condiaoned process that because of its "human and discursive" nature is
socially constructable within a context, I will argue, as seemingly far
removed from the public sphere as the bedroom, as the private predilection of romantic lovers. 2
The ~ritical Legal Studies movement has done much to expose
the cracks 1n the foundation of justice, the holes in her blindfold, the
uneven weight of her scales (Unger 1986; Leonard 1995). Gilligan
has exposed the gender bias of justice; Goodrich analyzed its rhetorical elitism; Sandel (1982), de Man (1979) and others shown how the
limi~ ~f justice reside in its attempt to be all-encompassing when in
fact tt is dependent on particular emanations (Gilligan 1982; Okin
1989; Rhode 1989; Goodrich 1987; Sander 1982; deMan 1979; Weber 1992, 232-57) . Even before the advent of postmodernism, the relationship of justice to its practical enactment-the law-had
troub.led scholars .. ~ile, by many accounts, the law is supposed to
funcaon as an obJecnfied form of justice at work in the social order
(Radbruch 1985), the vagaries of the legal code and its interpretation
have led to Hobbes' famous formulation of the law as the will of the
sovereign and Holmes, description of it as "what the courts will do"
~Hobbes 1985; Holmes 1985). Tarnished by its implementation, the
inherent fairness of justice often conflicts with the political and social
agendas of those who have the power to determine what is and what is
not fair.

.Th~ ~bs~ract and objective proportion of Aristode,s justice and
~e 1~tu1nve 1nherency of Rawl's fairness are further corroded by the
~nvas1ve encroachment of morality into the arena of social and legal

Judgment. Justice is administered through a set of rules or laws that
c.odify exis~in~ customs, religious beliefs, and individual predilecnons-subJecave stances that often have little or nothing to do with a
supposedly objective concept of fairness (Perelman 1980, 129). The
c~e stud~ th~t follows presents a particularly telling example of the
dilemma Justice faces when it is implemented by a court whose custo.mary ignoranc.e and moral disapproval of homosexuality leads to a
.ure to recogmze the love between two women. But this crime that
~ a.i:,e ~ot speak its name-homosexuality-has suddenly in the late
century begun to demand recognition, even in the face of
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11 IMaking Justice
resistance from the likes of a Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who in 1986 cited "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards" to deny a fundamental right of homosexual sodomy in
Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186 (1986] C. J. Burger, concurring).3
Although more recently in Romer v. Evans (1996 U.S. Lexis 3245)
Justice Kennedy relied on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn a Colorado anti-gay rights initiative,
federal and state legislatures, under the rhetoric of ethics and morality, are currently in the process of drafting and passing Defense of
Marriage Acts that prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages,
which the Hawaii Supreme Court has ruled are constitutionally mandated. Both sides of this struggle are no doubt convinced of the "justice,, of their cause. The national debate over the fairness of a legal and
social system of justice that has blindly criminalized and condemned
homosexuals since its inception indicates just how historically conditioned and incommensurate our beloved virtue is.
IfJustice must step down as a result of the exposure of her notorious selectivity throughout history, for theorists like Laclau, this deidealization is definitely a step in the right direction. This realization
of the human and discursive nature of fairness empowers democratic
subjects to demand recognition of their own versions of justice. 4 That
this public demand should occur as a result of the private love between two women seems at first blush to be the sensational stuff of
made-for-t.v. movies; but the Sharon Kowalski case, which began in
1983 and came before the Court of Appeals of Minnesota for the
third time in 1991, represents a remarkable series of events that demonstrate the social reality of one legal commentator's conclusion that
the "prohibition on gay marriages may be the most significant form of
discrimination on gay couples,, (Fajer 1992). The Kowalski case is a
true story in the most oxymoronic sense of that phrase, for it has produced a series of discursive representations--case law, newspaper articles, speeches, law review articles, and a book-that, I will argue,
have harnessed the narrative power of social reality in order to create
justice. 5 Through the reiteration of the particulars of this singular
story inside and outside the courtroom, a social text of justice emerges
that demonstrates the viability of same-sex partnership and exposes
the often arbitrary nature oflegal justice (Weber 1992). The Kowalski
case illustrates the democratic potentialities of a pragmatic approach
to justice that employs the power of discourse itself.-the telling of
one's story-as a strategy for the reclamation of justice (Fajer 1992) .
Although my principal concern will be the striking about-face
that takes place between the official texts of justice-the Minnesota
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Court of Appeals decisions in In re Guardianship of Kowalski 382
N.W2d 861 (Minn.App 1986) and In re Guardianship of·Kowalski
478 N.W2d 490 (Minn.App 1991)-1 am mindful of the need to
present a statement of facts that will orient the reader to the whole
story. Yet I am equally mindful that a recognition of the rhetorical and
particular nature of justice makes it impossible to divorce the act of
telling the Kowalski story from the presentation of a historical and
pragmatic version of justice. In other words, there is no whole story
that is not the side of a story, just as there is no statement of facts that
is not also a statement-a qualitative assertion about the events related
that is embedded in the selection of "facts" and the type of language
used to describe them. Every law student learns that the statement of
facts is the most important part of a legal brief. This lesson demonstrates not only the embeddedness of abstract justice in its particularized accounts, but also shows how justice inheres in the events that
take place outside as well as inside the courtroom, in whose halls there
exists "a socially institutionalised set of restrictions or limitations
upon who may speak, how much may be said and upon what topic
and in what contexts" (Goodrich 1987, 173). As I hope to demonstrate, the differences in the Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions of
1986 and 1991 court are telling, but what is even more telling is the
deep description that is missing from each of those accounts. It is the
untold story, in many ways the story of storytelling in the interim between appellate decisions, that embodies the methodology of chis social reversal of justice. What follows is not a neutral account of the
Kowalski case, for there can be no wholly objective statement of facts;
yet this restatement will detail the discursive and human movement of
this story in and outside the courts of justice.

On November 13, 1983, 27-year-old Sharon Kowalski was hit by
a drunk driver while returning her niece and nephew from St. Cloud
to the Iron Range near Duluth; as a result, she was severely impaired
both mentally and physically.6 At the time of the accident, Sharon
and her partner, Karen Thompson, had lived together for almost four
years, exchanged rings, and named each other as beneficiaries on their
life insurance policies. They were living together in a house recently
purchased by Karen. Neither had told their parents they were in alesbian relationship.
~ When Karen arrived at the hospital, the staff in the intensive care
unit refused to inform her of Sharon's status or to let her visit Sharon.
r
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13IMaking Justice
For hours they refused to tell Karen of her partnees prognosis. Most
intensive care units allow only immediate relatives to visit, and only
blood relatives or spouses are allowed to make decisions for comatose
or incapacitated patients. Sharon's parents eventually arrived, and initially they stayed at the couple,s home, allowing Karen to visit whenever she wished, but Mr. Kowalski began questioning why Karen was
spending so much time at the hospital.
In January, 1984, upon the recommendation of a hospital psychologist, Karen wrote a letter to the Kowalskis disclosing that she
and Sharon had been partners for four years. In March of 1984,
Karen filed a petition in probate court to become Sharon,s guardian.
Donald Kowalski cross-petitioned, and in April the parties entered
into a court-ratified settlement agreement:
The Court recognizes that Karen Thompson and Donald and
Della Kowalski each have a significant relationship with the
Ward, Sharon Kowalski, and finds each to be a suitable and
qualified person to discharge the trust.
However, in light of the difficulties existing between them the
Court is unwilling to appoint joint guardians. Therefore, the
Petitioner, Karen Thompson, agrees to the appointment of
Donald Kowalski as guardian with no recognition chat he is the
most suitable and best qualified among those available and
willing to discharge the trust, but is willing to accept the Court,s
appointment of Donald Kowalski under certain conditions and
restrictions in order to avoid a contested hearing in the matter,
which might not be in Sharon's best interest and in order to
make every effort to resolve the difficulties existing between
them. (In re Kowalski 382 N.W2d 861, 863)
Under the agreement, the Kowalskis and Karen Thompson were
given equal access to medical records and equal visitation rights,
though the day after the settlement, the Kowalskis, meeting Karen in
Sharon's room, told her to leave. In June of 1984, the probate court
decided to send Sharon to County Manor Nursing Home in Sarrell,
near St. Cloud. Karen spent hours each day visiting and working with
Sharon, who by August was able to write, swallow, and even on occasion speak. The Kowalskis visited their daughter less frequently; they
lived further away and there was considerable animosity between
them and Karen.
In September of 1984, the Kowalskis obtained a court order to
move Sharon to Park Point Manor Nursing Home in Duluth. H r
condition deteriorated at this time and she did not do well on tc t
administered at the Polinsky Memorial Rehabilitation Center. hnron
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began to be evaluated by doctors hired by her personal injury attorney, Jack Fena, whom the Kowalskis had engaged. In hearings concerning the proper placement of Sharon, the Kowalskis filed affidavits
claiming that Karen was "controlling" and had harassed Sharon about
money.
In October, Karen began to consult disability organizations and
civil rights groups. The St. Cloud Daily Times published an article on
October 18 in which they describe Karen as "an assistant professor at
St. Cloud State University (SCSU) who claims to have carried on a
secret lesbian relationship with Kowalski for the past four years" (Thompson 1988, 80-83). Donald Kowalski was reported as saying there
"was no way" his daughter had a lesbian relationship with Karen, and
"he said he and his wife are worried that Thompson will sexually
abuse their daughter ifThompson is allowed to continue visiting her.,,
"'(Karen Thompson) is about as sick as they come'," Donald
Kowalski stated in the article. Thompson told the reporter that the
Kowalskis had called and asked her if she had "'sexually abused our
daughter today?'" The Daily Times also reported Thompson as saying
"In our minds, we're married and are devoted to each other for a lifetime," and stating that she would set a national precedent for homosexuals if she was appointed Karen's guardian. Thompson told the paper that the Kowalskis were condescending, pampering, and ashamed
of their daughter, and, according to Karen's attorney, might be
subliminally blocking Sharon's progress so she will never be able to
communicate her feelings about Thompson.
In October, 1984, the Kowalskis filed for a temporary restraining
order against Karen, while Thompson's attorneys petitioned for a second psychological evaluation of Sharon and the removal of Kowalski
as guardian. The court issued a restraining order on November 1, prohibiting Thompson from disseminating the ward's medical records to
the media, from bringing anyone with her to visit the ward, and from
engaging in disruptive behavior at the nursing home. Sharon's day
passes were also restricted. Donald Kowalski was also restrained from
bringing visitors and disrupting the nursing home. The pending permanent injunction hearings and other motions were dropped by consent of the parties in December.
Meanwhile, Sharon was diagnosed with depression and her
physical condition had deteriorated since her first residency at
County Manor. Karen had videotaped her partner during her first setics of recoveries and Sharon's condition had clearly regressed. Ac~cording to Karen, Park Point was louder and less clean than County
rM:an?r, and Karen had to drive much farther to visit her. In January,
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Sharon typed responses at St. Cloud Handicap Services, confirming
that she was gay and that Karen was her lover (Thompson 1988,
Chronology). A rally took place in Duluth, protesting the conditions
of Park Point Manor Nursing Home.
Hearings on May 3 and May 9, 1985, ga~e rise to the, fir~t.Co.urt
of Appeals decision. Donald moved to terminate Karens v1s1tat10~
rights and to find her in contempt. Karen moved to remov~ K~walski
as guardian. The hearings featured testimony from a psych1atnst. procured by Jack Fena, the personal injury attorney. Dr. Cowan claimed
that Sharon became depressed after Thompson's visits. Some doctors
concurred. Although in June, 1985, Sharon communicated to the
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union interviewer that she was in a relationship with Karen, the court ruled on July 23, 1985, that Sharon
"lacks sufficient understanding ... to make ... responsible decisions"
and that the "elimination of that conflict [between Don and Della
Kowalski and Karen Thompson] and its adverse affect on the ward is
in the best interest of the ward" (382 N.W2d 861 , 864). The trial
court ordered the appointment of Donald Kowalski confirmed and
continued but now without limitation or condition. Kowalski immediately terminated the visitation rights of Thompson, the MC~U,
and disability groups; he then moved Sharon to another nursing
home in Hibbing. Karen and the MCLU appealed the decision whi~h
was affirmed by Chief Judge Popovich in a decision handed down m
March of 1986 (382 N.W2d 861 (cert. denied 106 S.Ct. 1467)).
After the decision, the headlines of the St. Cloud Daily Times read
"Lesbian Bitter Over Decision," and the article contained an allegation by Jack Fena that Thompson might be seeking guardianship for
financial reasons since a settlement was pending on the civil lawsuit
arising out of the accident. A letter to the editor reminded readers
that Thompson, as guardian of Sharon's person, could not profit from
her estate, and that Sharon had already incurred $25,000 in attorney
fees.
Karen continued to visit Sharon as a result of the temporary suspension of the judge's order pending appeal. During these visits~
Sharon pleaded with Karen, typing, "Help me. Get me out of here
and "please take me home with you" (Thompson 1988, 162~ . ~n. 1:ugust 20, however, Dr. William Wilson suspended Karens vtS1ong
privileges. In a letter to Fena, Wilson states: "it has come to my attention that Karen Thompson has been involved in bathing Sharon
Kowalski beh ind a closed door for a prolonged period of time. It has
also come to my attention that Ms. T hompson has alleged a sexual relationship with Sharon Kowalski that existed prior to the accident.
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Based on this knowledge and my best medical judgment concerning
Sharon and her welfare, I feel that visits by Karen Thompson at this
time would expose Sharon Kowalski to a high risk of sexual abuse"
(163). Nurses notes during this period, however, continued to show
how responsive and alert Sharon was when Karen worked with her.
After Dr. Wilson's order went into effect, Karen would not see
Sharon again for almost five years. She began to call disability action
groups, gay organizations, and feminist activists. Her story was reported in the alternative presses: The Advocate Qune, 1985), The
Washington Blade (April, 1985), Ms. (Sept., 1985), The Progressive
Quly, 1986). Donations and letters of support came. Karen met an
openly lesbian legislator, Karen Clark, when she spoke at a Take Back
the Night march in Minneapolis sponsored by the Minnesota Human
Rights Commission.
The second legal action that led to a published appellate court
decision took place in December of 1985, when Karen brought a motion in district court to hold the guardian Donald Kowalski in contempt of court for failing to take into consideration the best interests
and reliably expressed wishes of Sharon Kowalski regarding visitation.
The motion asked for rights of further discovery, further testing of
Sharon, and the removal of Jack Fena as attorney for the Kowalski
guardianship because of conflict of interest with the personal injury
suit. These motions were denied on January, 1986 and the denial of
Thompson's appeal is reported in 392 N.W2d 310.
Meanwhile, Jack Fena had contacted the university newspaper at
St. Cloud State. The subsequent article quoted Fena as stating that
Thompson was invading Sharon's right to privacy and injuring her
psychologically by divulging their lesbian relationship. He claimed in
the article that Thompson's motivations were purely monetary, seeking money from gay rights groups (Thompson 1988, 183-4). Similar
articles appeared in the mainstream presses.
Karen began to fly to California and Boston to speak about the
case. She was approached by the co-producers of the Life and Times of
Harvey Milk. She began to write a book with Julie Andrzejewski, Why
Can't Sharon Come Home?, published eventually in 1988. Free Sharon
Kowalski groups began raking shape around the country. Karen was
contacted by 60 Minutes, 'West 57th Street, and The Phil Donahue
Show, but none of these shows materialized when the Kowalskis refused to participate. She finally did appear on The Sally Jesse Raphael
_,.ShQW in St. Louis, but the one-half hour was shared with a rransexual
"md the in~roduction took five minutes. But Karen continued to acce~t speaking engagements, for example, at the National Gay and

~
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Lesbian Health Care Providers conference in Los Angeles and the Gay
Pride Rally in June of 1987 (Thompson 1988, 196-9).
An article entitled "The Silent Ordeal" appeared in the Sunday
edition of the St. Paul Pioneer Press also in June of 1987. "The Silent
Ordea"l told the story of the Kowalskis who have "borne the emotional burden of their daughter's paralysis. Their savings, their peace
of mind and their plans for a leisurely retirement all have been lost."
The article describes the despair of the Kowalskis as they "dutifully"
drive ten miles "week in and week out" to visit "their eerily silent
daughter" who "lies trapped in her twisted body" (Thompson 1988,
203). The following month, the National Organization of Women
(NOW) passed a resolution supporting Karen's case. In October, the
National Committee to Free Sharon Kowalski was organized.
Legal action began again in September of 1987, when Karen's attorneys filed a request for a competency hearing for Sharon. After a
hearing in November, the judge ruled in February of 1988 that
Sharon should be tested. The parties continued to litigate the question of the place and identities of the testers. Finally, in May of 1988,
Judge Robert Campbell ordered specialists at Miller-Dwan Medical
Center to examine Sharon to determine her level of functioning and
whether she could express her wishes on visitation. The doctors concluded that Sharon wished to see Karen and visitation rights were reestablished in January of 1989.
The conclusions of these new rests together with the national
prominence that the case had gained led to articles in the Los Angeles
Times (Aug. 5, 1988), New York Times (Feb. 8, 1989), and Washington
Post (Feb. 6, 1989). The case was attracting legal attention as well: The
Berkeley WOmens Law journal and Dayton Law Review both published
articles in which the Kowalski case was cited. Karen Thompson's own
book appeared in 1988.
There were further developments in 1988. At the end of the year,
Donald Kowalski notified the court that due to his own medical
problems, he wished to remove himself as guardian. The civil suit was
settled shortly before this announcement, awarding damages of
$330,000 dispersed as follows. $119,000 in attorney's fees, $125,000
for the State of Minnesota to offset medical assistance, $65,000 to the
Kowalskis, and the remaining amount, approximately $80,000, was
allotted to Sharon for her care. (A previous settlement had awarded
$330,000 to Sharon in trust for distribution to her after she was 50 in
2006.)
On August 7, 1989, Thompson filed a petition for appointment
as successor guardian of Karen,s person and estate, a petition whose

.."'

·-•"
:::I

ml\

en
c
c

··-·-"'
>
.
•
disClosure
0
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denial led to the most recent Minnesota Court of Appeals case in
1991. No competing petition was filed, and the court held a hearing
on August 2, 1990. The court wished to conduct further evidentiary
hearings on the unopposed petition and evidence was taken for the
next several months. Karen Tomberlin, a friend of the Kowalskis, contacted Sharon,s attorney and stated she would like to testify in opposition to Karen,s guardianship and would be willing to be considered as
an alternative guardian. The court heard testimony of 16 medical witnesses, including physicians, nurses, and therapists, who testified to
the benefits ofThompson's relationship with Sharon. Three witnesses
testified in opposition to Karen's petition: Debra Kowalski, Sharon's
sister; Kathy Schroeder, a friend of Sharon and the family; and
Tomberlin. None of these witnesses had medical training or were frequent visitors to Sharon. Sharon's parents did not attend the hearing.
On April 23, 1991, the trial court denied Thompson's petition
and appointed Tomberlin as guardian without conducting a hearing
about her qualifications. The ruling was appealed, by Karen, with amicus briefs filed by the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, the MCLU, and
NOW. On December 17, 1991, Judge Davies, finding a clear abuse of
discretion by the probate court, reversed the decision and remanded
the case with instructions to grant Thompson's petition without specific restrictions other than the accommodation of visiting rights for
Sharon's parents (478 N.W.2d 790).
Even after the case was remanded at the end of 1991, district
court Judge Campbell avoided signing the guardianship order. Not
until August of 1992 was Karen able to make arrangements to bring
Sharon to her handicap-accessible home in Clearwater, Minnesota,
where she and Karen now live with Karen,s other partner, Patty
Bressler. While Sharon still cannot use the left side of her body and
suffers from short-term memory loss, her doctors report that she is
"thriving" in her new home (Thompson 1995, 96-101).

{

Although the continuing jurisdiction of domestic relations
courts over matters of custody and guardianship leads not infrequently to changing orders with changing circumstances, the
Kowalski case nevertheless demonstrates a considerable reversal of
outlook toward the competency of Sharon,s lesbian lover to provide
fo~her. Yet this reversal comes not from some pre-millenial revelation
~_the Minnesota ~ourr of Appeals _in 1991 abour the inherenr injus~ce ?f homophobia and heterosexism, but from a trial court tran-
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script so overwhelmingly conclusive of Karen Thompson's dedication
to and support of her lover-together with an .absence of any substan·a1 evidence of obJ. ection to Karen or alternative to her-that the aptl
.
fc
ellate court was almost forced by that presentation ~ 1acts to sup:orr her claim. Justice is conrained within the evidenr1ary ':"5e Karen
has presented, but that embeddedness ~s no~ a m~ure of its ~sured
recognition or its existence as a transh1ston~al un1vers~. ~nst all
seeming odds, the trial court ignored the sixteen medical witnesses
(many of them independent), delayed judgm~~t for almost two years,
and then ruled against the justice of the peanon. In many ways the
indiscretions of the lower court are even more remarkable than the final award of guardianship to Karen by the Cou.rr of Appeals. Unquestionably the divergence of opinion between tnal and ap~e~at~ court
in their determinations of justice is evidence of Laclaus 1ns1stence
upon the irrational and arbitrary antagonism-the lack of reasonthat inhabits social agency, including those that hol~ legal po~er
(Laclau 1990, 4-5). But this radical critique of the arbiters of social
justice is not an argument for nihilism; on the co~~ary, for La~lau
this antagonism provides an opportunity for recognizing and capitalizing upon the malleability of justice, as the perseverant Thompson
did.

l
Nor can Thompson's achievement of guardianship ~e ~ccurate Y
assessed as a victory for some notion of transcendent JUsace, ~ome
stride toward a utopian, hate-free world. Had Donald Kowals~ not
resigned as guardian, the probability of her having pr~~ed IS unlikely. The chances of Sharon's sister or some~~e e.lse,,clruming guardianship in the future are also uncertain. The JUSnce Thompso~ has
won, after almost ten years of struggle, has left her with a legal bill. of
$125,000 and a partner severely injured by a random enc~unter w_ith
a drunk driver. Domestic partnership legislation protecong lesbian
· H awau,
· · wh ere It
· h as. been ruled
and gay lovers is not in place, even in
to be constitutionally required. But the historically contingent az:id
unstable nature of Thompson's success does not detract ~om its
power or its ramifications; rather it proves that the assumed JUStness
of discrimination against homosexuals is not as fundamentally unshakable as Justice Burger would have led us to believe (Bower_s v.
Hardwick 1986). Thompson and Sharon's victory is evidence ~at JUStice is indeed shakable and there for the shaking by those with the
stamina.
th
Thompson goes out and makes some justice of her own from e
time that she decides to go public in 1984 after the rem~val of Sh:Uon
from County Manor. Her public activism in the pursuit of her nghts
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to a private domestic relation takes the form of telling her story, making her case-producing forms of representation that enter into the
social arena of antagonism where identity, the law, and justice are ultimately forged. Those phone calls, letters, interviews, speeches, articles, and books function as agents in the production of equity. Her
success is varied and her tactics often backfire as she is accused of
sensationalizing her supposed affair for monetary and political gain,
accused of damaging Sharon by outing her, but these accusations are
not completely inaccurate. Political gain is exactly what Karen's demand for justice depends on, for without it, the political power of
those who ignore, marginalize, and discredit gays and lesbians will go
unchecked. Karen "outs" herself at the same time that she divulges her
relationship to Sharon, and when she does come out, she faces the
continued denial of a community that refuses to allow her to confront
its open homophobia: her relation to Sharon is "alleged," fabricated
for political gain, unfair to Sharon's reputation. Even when this crime
dares speak its name, no one listens. When the St. Paul Pioneer Press
and the St. Cloud Daily Times publish articles entitled "Lesbian Bitter
Over Decision" and "The Silent Ordeal" in which Karen is depicted
as a gold-digging political crackpot and the Kowalskis as Christian
martyrs, Thompson finds herself answering charges of publicity-seeking and outing while she tells her story of a woman loving a woman
on the Sally Jesse Raphael Show.
Ironically, Karen s attempt to publicize her lover's plight takes
place within a social climate where the myth of the private or
unpublicized is linked to notions of rationality, level-headedness,
non-distortion, and, by implication, fairness. From the moment the
St. Cloud Daily Times on October 14, 1984 suggests that Thompson
is a political feminist on a crusade to set precedent for homosexuals at
the expense of the defenseless Sharon, the announcement of Karen's
lesbian love becomes equated with sensationalism, possessiveness,
ab~e, and even defamation. Jack Fena, the Kowalskis' attorney, capitalizes on the cultural taboo against telling the gay story when he
thr:atens to sue .Kare? for slander, seeks a temporary restraining order
aga.mst her for invasion of privacy, and uses Karen's publicity campaign as evidence of her disruption of Sharon's quietude. The probate
c.oun assi~ilates this notion of Karen's irrational and potentially acuon~ble ~iscourse by ~uling that she is "overbearing,' "disruptive,"
and invasive of Sharons privacy (478 N.W.2d at 795). This rhetoric
,rOf_ -privacy puts Thompson in a double-bind. On the one hand,
( ~on's accident. and subseque~t disputes prove that privacy is pre: ro:isly unsustamable and demmental once a court needs evidence
1

1

:~

of affinity to award custody. On the other hand, when Karen does
come out, she faces the ideological ethos of privacy that the courts
and media use as a tool to condemn her publicity campaign. Her situation shows not just that the personal is inevitably political, but that
the political constructs and maintains a notion ~f the p~rso~al or private which privileges the propriety of not tellmg ones side of the
story, not using discourse to demand one s own :ersion ~f justice: By
accusing Thompson of sensationalism and behavior that IS potentially
actionable as a tort, the courts and mainstream media protect their ignorance of homosexuality by condemning, marginalizing, and scandalizing its disclosure. This negation of public statements withi? ~e
channels of public institutions is one of the primary ways those insututions preserve their versions of the truth by removing and denigrating other versions that enter the discursive marketplace. .
.
Yet it is precisely Thompson s dogged process of naming, this reiterative and emphatic insistence upon telling her account, that eventually forces a judicial accounting of the validity of her same-sex partnership. Karen s talks, rallies, meetings, and media appearances
represent demands for recognition that are both "discursive," as
Laclau notes, and sensational or "human": they evoke emotion and
gain strength not primarily from an appeal to some illusory standard
of objectivity, but from embracing the rhetorical and dramatic power
of their narratives. In fact, the drama of Thompson's representational
account is indivisible from its power as a tool for the reshaping of justice.
Karen s activism as a result of the decisions of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals, her cause celebre, does not go unnoticed by the legal
community, the Minnesota legislature, or the national media. Over a
period of eight years, her own attorneys, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, and the National Organization of Women file over twenty motions, including appeals before
the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Spureme Court of the
United States in the first appellate decision. By the time of the 1991
Court of Appeals decision awarding Thompson ·guardianship, the
stamp of Karen s extra-judicial activism is clearly detectable in the text
of the coures opinion. The once overbearing and "troublesome" appellant has now become "highly cooperative and exceptionally attentive to what treatments and activities are in Sharon's best interest"
(478 N.W.2d at 794). Karen emerges as a "forceful advocate for
Sharon's rehabilitation," and the court finds no evidence to suggest
that Sharon is "harmed or exploited by her attendance at public
events,,, including gay and lesbian marches and the annual conference
1
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of the National Organization of Women, where she received an award
(478 N .W2d at 796). Nor do the judges find a conflict of interest in
Thompson,s money-raising activities since all the money was raised in
Sharon,s name. Although the circumstances of the case had changed
1991, especially in regard to the ward's improved capacity according to experts, the appellate court's opinion reflects a new respect for
Sharo~ and Karen,s activism, care, and sexual orientation, a respect no
doubt mfluenced by the national attention Thompson had worked to
gain outside the courtroom.
This publicity, whether within or outside the hallowed halls of
justice, operates as a mechanism of power that draws attention to the
legal and social vulnerability of lesbian and gay panners. If a theorist
of sexuality and power like Foucault is correct when he argues that the
deployment of sexuality operates by methods of power that are "irreducible,, to "law», and embedded in techniques of "normalization,,,
that the re~.ation of sexuality takes place beyond the state and its apparatus withm a complex network of private regulations, discreti~nary decisions, and preferences, then Karen Thompson,s concentranon on the techniques of social representation serves as an example of
how those techniques can influence the legal apparatus (Foucault
1980, 89-90). By perseverance and determination, she makes the benefits of her love known to her disabled partner, to the medical community, and to the community at large.
. . The Mi~nesota Coun of Appeals' sudden recognition of the validity of lesbian partnership in 1991 stands in marked contrast to the
opinions of the probate and appellate coun up to that date. One of
the principal strategies of the initial appellate court decision by Chief
Judge Popovi~h in 1986 entails the rendering of Sharon legally incapable of making her own decisions or expressing her own wishes,
thereby putting the court in control of her destiny. Minnesota law req~r~. tha~ the "~est interest of the ward,, should be the guiding
pn.n1c1ple m making the momentous decision of guardianship appointment, a determination creating a legal relation that makes the
ward subject to greater external control over her life than if she were
convicted of a crime. 7 The ward's desire is an important factor in deducing ~at i~terest but only if the ward has sufficient capacity to
form an intelligent preference (Minn.Stat. 525.551 (5); 382 N.W.2d
at 865). Affirming the lower court,s holdings, Chief Judge Popovich
rules that Sharon,s inconsistent responses to questioning not only ren,.A~}ier stated preference for Karen "unreliable,, but also evidence her
I
al "'incapacity.
. ,, Sharon. CC•is burdendened with a child,s mental ca{ ~eg.~
t . ~ j~j between four and SIX years of age,,, her "communication skills
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are limited," and she may never improve, the court finds, upholding
the probate court's decision and discounting conflicting testimony
about Sharon,s responsiveness. Once the ward is found to be incapacitated, the court as agent of the state gains the power to act as parens
patriae in deciding the ward,s best interest (382 N.W2d at 863, 866).
The court's arrogation of power over Sharon through the invocation
of its latinate doctrine of state-as-parent illustrates what Goodrich
calls the "alien linguistic practices," "the obscure, professionalized and
impenetrable language" that the law uses to exercise its control
(Goodrich 1987, 1).
The court's "dumbing down" of Sharon, the reduction of this 27year-old woman to an unreliable 4-year-old child, de-sexualizes, dehumanizes, and effectively silences her for purposes of the court's decision. It also obviates the need to confront Sharon's lesbianism since,
under this adjudication, she is legally too young to have a sexual preference, thereby supporting the court's continued ignoring of homosexuality. Once the court determines that the fatherland knows best,
the adjudication of Sharon's interest becomes a matter of interpretation by a parental appellate court and thus contingent upon that
court's construction of the evidence. Sharon's adjudicated status as a
child gives the court the leverage it needs to assume her ties are stronger to her parents than to her "roommate" Karen. Not surprisingly
"the unconditional parental love of Donald Kowalski," mirroring that
of the paternal state, creates a legal presumption of qualification for
guardian status which is "even stronger when the child has been incapacitated to a four-to-six-year-old mental ability" (382 N.W.2d at
865).
Once Sharon is effectively silenced through her infantilizacion,
her ties to Karen become not only inconsequential but in fact dangerous. Although the court recognizes the four years of co-habitacion,
the ring exchange, and the life insurance policies, the relationship is
still described as "uncertain,, (382 N.W.2d 861, 863). The court cites
testimony of a closed bank account and a sister's testimony that
Sharon told her that Karen was "possessive,, as evidence of this uncertainty rather than the reverse. Although the court notes that Karen
"claims a lesbian relationship," the opinion notes that "Sharon never
told her family of such a relationship or admitted it prior to the acci- :s
dent." Instead of taking judicial notice of the stigma attached to coming-out to the Kowalskis in the Iron Range, a working class area in c
c
Minnesota, the court uses Sharon's closeted status before the accident 0
as evidence that she is not a lesbian. Sharon,s tescimony after the accident that she loves Karen is inconsistent and unreliable, and since she
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is a child now anyway, her sexuality does not exist. Sharon's near fatal

accident has dealt a lethal blow to her sexual identity; it has disabled
her from both within and without. The adjudication of her incapacity
demonstrates that there can be no closet without a room of one s own
into which to emerge.
1

Karen, on the other hand, is characterized by the court as a "possessi.ve" ~esbian wh~se "disruptive behavior,, and publicity-seeking dissemmation of medical records to the media must be restrained. The
Kowalskis' disruptions and hate of Karen is ignored by the court.
~ud~e Popovich cites a presumption in favor of "family ties,, in making Its guardianship decision, a presumption that does not, of course,
~end to ~ame~sex partnership because for this court the alleged lesbian relationship is legally nonexistent (382 N.W.2d 861, 865).s
C~nstructing justice around the denial and denigration of homosexuality and false glorification of parental love, the appellate court affirms
the decision of the probate judge based on the evidence from doctors
tI:~t :the ward enters a detrimental, depressed state after Thompson's
v1s1ts (382 N .W.2d 861, 864). The subtle demonization of Karen as
an .~ressive lesbian whose domineering intrusion has psychologically .1n!ured the helpless Sharon is writ large throughout the court's
opm1on. The best interests of the ward are not what she wants because
what she wants "upsets,, her and "results in her depression. " The court
must protect ~har~n from the feminist lesbian who is ruining her life
and retur? this ~ild. t.o ,,the b~som of her family, where the "strong
confidential relationship and unconditional love,, of the Kowalskis
will shelter the ward (382 N.W2d at 865).
In spite of the introduction of evidence that Sharon's depression
occurred because she did not want Karen to leave and that Karen had
devoted countless hours to her lover and made substantial rehabilitative strides with her, the court sees fit to uphold Kowalski's refusal to al!ow Karen any visitation at all. This decision comes not only
from .a failure t~ recognize the legitimacy of same-sex domestic partnersh1p--the failure to tell its story-the insistence upon its silence,
but also. from ~e court's "ignorance" of Karen and Sharon's private
love, wh1~h provides the opportunity to overlay its own story onto the
case, the ideology of family values. The initial erasure of the homoco~pl~ in love by the avoidance of Sharon's closet is followed by
a re-mscnp~1on of the homosexual as single lesbian feminist seeking
to undermine the unconditional love of parent and child. The
~~,.!alskis' ag~, their ~ail.ur~ to take Sharon out of the nursing home
( ~qn .any occasion, theu 1ns1stence that their daughter is a "severely
;ribrrrdamaged" burden on their golden years constitute statements of

sexu:i
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fact not part of the court's ideological narrative,. nor even part of the
story of justice that their statement of facts will acknowled~e. The
court's refusal to recognize the legitimacy of same-sex domestic partnership, no doubt for fear of its striking similitude to the sacrament of
heterosexual marriage, not only renders Shar~n ~d Kare~s four-year
co-habitation as ring-exchanging "roommates weightless m the s~es
of justice but also, in fact, under the transformatio.n ~f the s~y, .~ibl~
toting Karen into a feminazi, turns their part~er~hip i?to a hab1hty in
the annals of the family law courtroom. Theus 1s a discourse .tha~ effaces same-sex domestic partnership and turns homosexuality in.to
loveless sexual abuse that foments depression and disrupts the social
.
.
order epitomized by the nuclear famil~. . .
But the 1986 appellate court denves its ideological sense of J~tice not from the pre-ordained bedrock of Leviticus but from an ev1dentiary transcript that provides them with a srareme.n,t of facts upon
which it can hang its homophobic hat. The Kowalskis ~~orney, Jack
Fena, had engineered the removal of Sharon to a care facility removed
from St. Cloud and provided the medical evidence necess~ ~o find
that Sharon's incapacity rendered her unreliable. The psychiatrist, Dr.
Cowan who testified to both Sharon's inconsistent responses and depressio~, was Fenas hired psychiatrist for the personal injury civil suit.
(Fena had a vested interest in Sharon's non-recovery for p.urp~ses of
that civil award but the court found no conflict of interest m his serving as both att~rney for the guardian and for Sharon in the civil suit
(392 N .W2d 311, 314). Cowan s conclusions were corroborated ?Y
the affidavit testimony of Dr. Steven Goff of the Polinsky Memonal
Rehabilitation Center and Dr. Julie Moller, the physician at the nursing home. But the court neither discusses nor cites the considerabl~
medical testimony to the contrary, including the evidence of Sharons
previous recovery at St. Cloud. Jack Fena was also able ~o. build his
case against Karen Thompson by seeking tempor~ restr<~.mmg ord~rs
and supplying evidence of Karen s supposedly disruptive behav~or
over the conditions at the Park Point Nursing Home. Judge Popovich
does not reach his decision in a complete ideological vacuum; he is
able to locate a version of equity within the evidentiary transcript that
is provided by the advocate for the Kowalskis. That transcript tells a
story that silences Sharon, demonizes Karen, and re-instates the symbolic paternal script that father knows best.
..
.
The most recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in the
Kowalski matter handed down on December 17, 1991, finds a clear
,
,
abuse of discretion by a uial court that has denied Karen Thompsons
petition for guardianship after Donald Kowalski s withdrawal and ap1
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pointed Karen Tomberlin guardian in her stead. Judge Davies reverses
and remands the case with instructions to grant Thompson,s petition
without specific restrictions other than the accommodation of visiting
rights for Sharods parents (478 N.W2d 790, 796). Thompson,s petition to be successor guardian was filed on August 7, 1989, the law's
year-and-a-half delay adding insult to the injury of a trial court's decision to award guardianship finally to Karen Tomberlin, a friend of the
Kowalskis described by the lower court as a "neutral" third party
needed to heal the wounds of a "family torn asunder into opposing
camps" (478 N.W.2d at 794). Judge Davies is quick to point out the
discrepancy between the trial coures adjudication and the testimony
in the record. At the hearing Tomberlin testified that she was a friend
of the Kowalskis and had a primary goal of moving Sharon as close as
possible to her parents in the Iron Range, though she herself would be
unable to take her in. Tomberlin rarely visited Sharon, but spoke with
the Kowalskis on a weekly basis and was instrumental in securing the
testimony of Debra Kowalski, Sharon's sister, against Thompson.
Most importantly, the trial court presented no evidence of
Tomberlin,s qualifications for the job under Section 525.551(5) of the
Minnesota Statutes, which requires consideration of the ward,s preference and the degree of commitment of the proposed guardian. As the
Court of Appeals notes, "Sharon's current treating physician testified
that she had had no interaction with Tomberlin, and she was not
asked to evaluate Tomberlin,s knowledge of, or interaction, with
Sharon" (478 N.W2d at 795). Judge Davies finds that a review of the
record shows that Tomberlin is neither an impartial mediator nor a
qualified guardian, that the facts do not warrant the justice meted out
by the trial court.

f

f

Behind the trial coures error in appointing Tomberlin, who
rarely visited Sharon and who had not even formally petitioned the
court for the successor position, was an obvious desire not to appoint
Karen Thompson and to keep Sharon under the control of her family
"torn asunder." The Court of Appeals counts the ways that the trial
court "found fault" with Thompson, and each elicits a remarkable reversal in attitude (478 N.W.2d at 795-6). First the trial court "suggested that Thompson,s statement to the family and to the media that
she and Sharon are lesbians was an invasion of privacy, perhaps rising
to the level of an actionable tort" (478 N.W.2d at 795). Secondly, the
trial court took issue with Thompson taking Sharon to public events,
/ ..including some gay and lesbian-oriented gatherings and other com~~ity events, reac~ng .no doubt to Karen's extra-judicial strategy of
rmaltipg her own JUStlce. Finally, the lower court found that
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, sol'icitanon
· · of legal defense funds and testimony
Thompsons
, that
'dshe
had been involved in other relationship~ since S~arons a~~i ent
"raised questions of conflicts of interest with Sharons welfare (478
N.W.2d at 795).
l .
·
ful
Although Judge Davies answers each of these.c aims ma ~e
in
embedded
way, as I shall discuss momentarily, the homophobiaWh
d
· the
lower coures findings deserve considerable pause.
at oes it say
· ty that makes it civilly actionable for one person to an1
about a socie
nounce the sexual orientation of another, to allow ~ne person to co.lect damages for pain and suffering as a result of ha:mg her se~~al on.
d'vulged~
of
entation
i
. Purun·g aside the pragmatic recognition
.
.
.
homophobic antagonism in social reality, the trial ~o~rt in this case is
seeking to cast Thompson's action as a tort, as a civil wrong-~anta
mount to an assault or battery. Although bereft of all other n~hts,
Sharon from the perspective of the probate court ~ho~ld be permi~ed
to maintain her right to stay in the closet, to remain silent concernmg
something about which society, in a more honest venue, has .promulgated the following rule: don,t ask, d~n,t tell. ~he golden sil:nce :
this suggested tort is, however, sufficiently tellmg. ~ Sedgwick h.
argued, "silence is rendered as pointed and performative as sp~ech, m
relations around the closet" (Sedgwick 1990, 4). The not comin.g out
story, which the traditional venues of legal justice have a vested inter.
est in maintaining, is a sub-genre in need of exposure.
The lower court casts the petitioner not only as a pote.n.tial
tortfeasor, but also as an exploiter of the helpless Sharon for political
propaganda. Taking judicial notice that Sharon and Karen were f~a
tured guests at gay and lesbian rallies, the lower court chafes at ~e m· 'sm, the public.refringement on its power by Thompsons, soci'al acnvi
porting of her case to the community. The court,s five-year expulsi~?
of Karen,s visitation rights and endorsement of Donald Kow~ski s
guardianship have been in the "best interest" of Sharon as determmed
by a paternalistic panel of judges, but Karen's removal .of her lover
from an institution for an afternoon to attend a gay rally m her ho~or
is judged exploitive. The threat of an adjudication o: justice outside
the venue of the courtroom leads the lower court to incorporate 3J.1d
· d'ici'al promotion
· s within the disattempt to condemn those extra-JU
course of the common law of invasion of privacy. The influence of
Thompson,s justice-making is great enough to lead to its citat.ion b~ a
concerned probate court, demonstrating the power of her discursive
accounting.
,
That influence also manifests itself in the lower courts first
· an inva
· der of pricharge of conflict of interest. T hompson ·is not JUSt
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vacy and publicity monger; she is also con-woman. She has marshalled the forces of LAMBDA Legal Defense Fund, the National Organization of Women (NOW), and the bleeding hearts of others for
her own personal gain. Both of these organizations and the MCLU
have also filed amicus briefs in the case, further evidencing the power
Thompson has amassed outside the courtroom. At the August 2,
1990 hearing, the lower court judge must have faced seven lawyers arguing on behalf of Karen, sixteen witnesses testifying to her qualifications, and a courtroom no doubt full of the press. No wonder he took
the case under submission for a year and a half, and then sought to
find Thompson at fault for having such strength.
The second conflict of interest charge suggests that Thompson is
promiscuous and, therefore, not devoted to her lover. As if her characterization as malfeasant, exploitative, and avaricious were insufficient,
the lower court must also charge her with sexual misconduct. Her admission of sexual activity with others during the seven years since
Sharon's accident has rendered her undevoted to the woman she "alleges" to have had a relationship with before 1983. To justify its reasoning, the court must put Karen in a double bind: on the one hand,
her relationship to Sharon must remain "unclear," "alleged," and a
maner of "privacy"; on the other, Thompson is compelled to remain
committed to this fantasmatic "affinity" (478 N.W.2d at 794).
The Court of Appeals' reply to these adjudications manifests the
degree to which Thompson's representational pressure has effected a
new anirude toward same-sex partnership. The invasion of privacy
finding, akin to defamation, is obviated by the truth, as the statement
of facts by Judge Davies makes clear: the nebulous four-year "roommate" designation of 1986 has turned into a "lesbian relationship" in
which Karen and Sharon are "sharing a home in St. Cloud" (478
N.W.2d at 791). What becomes "unclear" for this Court of Appeals as
opposed to the 1986 court is not the existence of a lesbian relationship but the "extent to which Sharon had publicly acknowledged
her preference at the time of the accident" (478 N.W.2d 795). More
importantly, Sharon's doctors and therapists have testified that Sharon
had voluntarily come-out to them on more than one occasion and
that Thompson's earlier revelation was "crucial for the doctors to understand who their patient was prior to the accident" (478 N.W.2d at
796). In 1986, Sharon's disability had rendered her desire to see Thompson as "irrelevant" because "inconsistent" and against her best in/ Jer:_st. The medical justification for Karen's outing of herself and her
/ ~er was not part of the 1986 record. Although the ward had made
[ ffu~~r mental progress since the time of the accident, according to
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Thompson there was ample evidence of Sharon's acknowledgment of
their relationship in 1986. The earlier Court of Appeals had arguably
exploited the issue of capacity to insure that the question of sexual
preference remain irrelevant except in so far as it was fabricated by
Thompson.
The 1991 Court of Appeals' decision lays the lower court's exploitation claim to rest by citing the testimony of Sharon's health care
workers that she "'had a great time'" and interacted well with other
people at these gay and lesbian events (478 N.W.2d at 796). The
counter-testimony came from Debra Kowalski and Kathy Schroeder,
a friend of Sharon's and the Kowalskis. They testified that they did
not think Sharon would enjoy the events that were "gay and lesbianoriented in nature." The court dismissed this hearsay because Debra
and Kathy, unlike the health care workers, were never in attendance at
the rallies to evaluate Sharon's reaction firsthand. The likelihood of
the Kowalskis visiting a gay and lesbian rally with Sharon is small
enough to make the court's comment almost comic in tone: "they're
here; they're queer; get used to it."
Judge Davies also handily dismisses the conflict of interest claims
by pointing to evidentiary findings, locating justice in the testimonial
record of the lower court. All the money collected by Thompson was
used to defray "the cost of years of litigation" and any extra was used
to purchase extra equipment for Sharon-a voice machine, a motorized wheel chair, a hospital bed, a lift. In fact, Karen, who emerges in
a rather heroic light in this court's opinion, has built a disabled-accessible home for Sharon in St. Cloud.
Thompson's sexual relations with others during Sharon's
convalescence, gleaned from the testimony of one doctor in the
record, is assessed an occurrence that "is not uncommon" for spouses
of severely handicapped patients and not indicative of a level of continued "commitment to the injured person" (478 N.W.2d at 796).
The court cites with approval Karen's testimony that any third person
in her life must understand that she and Sharon are "a package deal"
(478 N.W.2d at 496). Remember that the 1986 court had depicted
Karen as a potentially abusive, bitter lesbian who was attempting to
fabricate a relationship with Sharon for political and monetary gain, a
position not unlike the trial court's stance in 1991. Besides the important fact that this transcript comes before a Court of Appeals made up
of entirely different judges, the re-casting of Thompson as a stellar
care-giver-the recognition of the justice of her claim-must be attributable in part to the uncommon strength of the petitioner's expert
testimony. There was no testimony from the health care community
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that could question Thompson's "interest or commitment" or her
"ability to maintain a current understanding of the ward's or
conservatee's physical and mental status and needs" within the meaning of Section 525.539(7) of the Minnesota Statutes. In 1986, the
Kowalskis' personal injury attorney had marshalled his own expert
testimony to throw both Sharon's and Thompson's reliability into
doubt. The preference of the ward, which by statute is also a major
factor in the decision of guardianship, becomes a major factor in
Davies' decision. Though the trial coun still insisted on Sharon's
unreliability because of her inconsistency, the reviewing court finds
that the medical testimony overwhelmingly shows that Sharon has
proclaimed her desire to be with Karen. The silence of incapacity, adjudicated by the "discretion" of the family law judge, provided the
lower court the opportunity to promulgate its homophobic ideology
by rendering Sharon's sexuality both moot and mute. For Sharon, the
finding of incapacity became the deadbolt on her closet.
While the 1991 transcript quite clearly shows that the Kowalskis
had to some extent given up the fight and that Karen had amassed an
arsenal of accounts on her behalf, the immersion of justice in the multiplication of representation-the reiteration of one's story-does not
entirely explain the unusual outcome of the this case. The divergence
in 1991 between the lower court and the Court of Appeals reflects the
depth of homophobic entrenchment in a social milieu that is facing
new versions of equity in domestic relations. That the lower court was
willing to face an almost certain reversal in order to prevent Thompson from becoming her partner's guardian reflects the polarization
that exists over the justification of same-sex partnership and, more
fundamentally, over the rights of gays and lesbians. Those rights are
neither fundamental nor absolute; they are sustained within a human
and discursive context that is enmeshed in a symbolic network of
"sensational" narratives, reiterated accounts that shape the parameters
of values like justice. These forms of discourse vie for prominence
within historical settings that substantiate Laclau's claim to an antagonism within the social subject that cannot be occluded or subsumed
under an illusion of moral authority.
The Court of Appeals concludes its opinion by chastising the
lower court for its lack of respect for lesbian relationships:
All the medical testimony established that Sharon has the
capacity reliably to express a preference in this case, and she has
:: clearly chosen to return home with Thompson if possible. This
~ choice is further supported by the fact that Thompson and
tr\ jharon are a family of affinity, which ought to be accorded
\J;""J,,,1
'(14.tJ#"

respect. (478 N .W2d at 797)
The victory of this lesbian couple is both a human and discursive
one: Karen's story of domestic love has led the court to recognize the
affinity between homosexual and heterosexual notions of family. At
this discursive moment, the irrational basis of the antagonism that
underlies any phobia-its status as a projection of one's fear of loss of
self-definition-is demonstrated by the court's use of the loaded term
"family" to describe a lesbian relationship. "Family," after all, is a code
word for heterosexism, and the suggestion that such a symbolic signifier could include the very homosexuality which it is often used to exclude, strikes at the heart of the repressed affinity behind insistent difference. That affinity, which is at a fundamental level a fear of lack of
autonomy, produces and will continue to produce versions of justice
that will include and exclude, respect and disrespect. These historical
versions are changed when narratives like the Kowalski case produce a
statement of facts that deconstructs the boundaries of equity and calls
for a new version of justice, which must recognize the "truth" or validity of the Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson story. Thompson's
persistent re-presentation of her dramatic narrative in venues le~
and extra-legal exemplifies one way in which justice steps down and ts
shaped by those who demand it.
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Notes
"Fairness," "equality," and "proportionality" are Aristotle's terms
(N ichomachean Ethics, 1162b21, 3 la10-24, and 1131b17 quoted in James
Kern Feibleman, justice, Law and Culture (Boston: Martinus N ijhoff, 1985)
174-5. Kant associates the highest form of justice with reason (Immanuel
Kant, The Philosophy ofLaw, trans. W Hastie (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark,
1887)) 198, quoted in Wai Chee Dimock, Residues ofjustice: Literature, Law,
Philosophy (Berkeley: U. of California, 1996) 12. John Rawls' A Theory ofjustice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1971) is based in large part on h is notion of intuitive fairness. See also Rawls' "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,"
injustice, ed. Thomas Morawetz (New York: New York U., 1991) 3-32.
1.

2

·,,baclau states: " .. . the contingent and precarious nature of any objectivity
/ ha.s..only become fully apparent with contemporary capitalism and its associ/ £~~ ~slocatory e~e~ :Vhich sh.ow the historicity of being, and that this rec*. ognJ!?On of the histonc1ty of bemg-and thus of the purely human and dis-

{

·,i!,/

cursive nature of t.ruth-opens new possibilities for a radical policies" (1990,

4).
For those who oppose homosexuality, it is a matter of taste, custom, and individual predilection, like, Justice Scalia notes, eating "snails," wearing "fur,"
or hating "the Chicago Cubs," though by some strange logic it is also "morally wrong and socially harmful" (Romer v. Evans 3245 at 20, 15 [1996] J.
Scalia, dissenting). For many lesbians and gay men, however, sexual orientation is not just a matter of moral choice but also determined by some combination of genetics and cultural forces (see the introduction to Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick's Epistemology ofthe Closet (Berkeley: U. of Califonia, 1990).

3.

4: The demand or struggle for recognition is Hegel's concept for the process
by which concrete historical engagements bring together the subjective positions of citizens and the objective notion of absolute good. I use the phrase as
it is developed in Fred Dallmayr's "Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law,"
Deconstruction 301-2, citing G. Hegel, Philosophy of Ri.ght, trans. T. Knox
(1967).
A roughly chronological review of many of the publications that concerned
the Kowalski case include "Gay Issue Clouds Fight For Custody," St Cloud
Daily Times 18 October 1984; The Washington Blade 26 April 1985; The
vocau 25 June 1985: 13; "Lesbian Bitter Over Decision," St Cloud Daily
Times 24? July 1985; Joanne Linsley, "A Righc to Care," Progressive July
1986: 15.

5.

Atf-

The latter publicity preceded the two Court of Appeals decisions, In re
Kowalski 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1085
(1986) and In re Kowalski 392 N .W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). My
analysis concentrates on the first of these two cases.
Rhonda Rivera, "Queer Law: Sexual Orientation in the Mid-Eighties, Part
II," 11 U. ofDayton L. &v. 275, 327 (1986); "The Silent Ordeal," St. Paul
Pioneer Press ? July 1987; Betty Cuniberti, "Just Whose Life is It?" Los Angeles
Times 5 August 1988: Part V, at 1, Column 1; Joyce Murdoch, "Fighting for
Control of Loved One: Guardianship Dispute Pits Disabled Woman's Partner, Family," Washington Post 5 August 1988: Al; Nadine Brozan, "Gay
Groups Are Rallied to Aid Two Women's Fight," New York Times 7 Au~
1988: sec. 1, at 13 or 26; Peter Johnson, "Disabled Minnesota Womans
Rights Focus ofTwenty One Rallies," USA Today 8 August 1988: Sec.A at 3;
Nancy R. Gibbs and Clare Mead Rosen, "Tragic Tug-Of-War/' Time 132
(August 22, 1988): 71; Nancy Livingston, "A Bitter Love Triangle," S~n
Francisco Chronicle 11 September 1988: Sec. Wor at 1; Patricia Hole, "Tragic
Story Spurs Legal Challenge," San Francisco Chronicle 2 October 198~: 2;
Karen Thompson, Why Can't Sharon Kowalski Come Home? (San Franc1sco:
Spinsters, Aunt Lute, 1988) (my statement of facts relies on Thompson's account); Belinda Stradley, "Why Can't Sharon Kowalski come Home?" 4 Ber-

keley 'WOmms Law journal 166, 169 (1988-9).
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Peter Freiberg, "Thompson Wins Early Round,,, Advocate 31 January 1989:
14; "Minnesota Woman Allowed to See Disabled Lover," Washington Post 6
February 1989: Al 8; Nadine Brozan, "Woman's Hospital Visit Marks Gay
Rights Fight," New York Times 8 February 1989: Al 1 or D25; Rick Harding,
"Thompson Visits Her Disabled Lover," Advocate 14 March 1989: 10; Frontiers News Magazine 29 December 1989: 33; Ruthan Robson and S. E.
Valentin, "Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal
Theory," 63 Temple L. R.ev. 511, 515 (1990); John Yewell, "After Tug ofWar
Ends, Sharon Kowalski is Sure to be the Loser,,, St. Paul Pioneer Press-Dispatch 2 December 1990: A9; David Link, "The Tie That Binds: Recognizing
Privacy and the Family Commitments of Same-Sex Couples," 23 Loyola L.A.
Law Review 1055, 1135 (1990).
The most recent Court of Appeals decision came down on December 17,
1991 (In re Kowalski 478 N.W.2d 790 [1991]). Nadine Brozan, "Two Sides
Are Bypassed in Lesbian Case," New York Times 26 April 1991: Al4 or Al2;
Nan Hunter, "Sexual Dissent and the Family," Nation 253 (October, 1991):
406, 408-10; "Rights Denied," The Progressive 55 (1991): 9; Tamara Lewin,
"Disabled Woman's Lesbian Partner is Granted Right to Be Her Guardian,"
New York Times 18 December 1991: Al 7 or A26; Arthur S. Hayes and Wade
Lambert, "Court Awards Guardianship of Disabled Woman to Lesbian Partner," Wall Street Journal 18 December 1991: B4 or B6; Dawn Schmirz,
"Kowalski and Thompson Wm!," Gay Community News 22 December 1991:

I;

Mark Hansen, "Gay-Rights Victory," ABA Journal 78 (1992): 22; "Thompson and Kowalski Win the Big One," offour backs 22 (1992): 9; Jennifer J.
Robles, "A Family of Affinity," Advocate 6 October 1992: 44-47; Anne B.
Goldstein, "Representing Lesbians," I Texas Journal of Women and Law 301
(1992); Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law, ed. William B. Rubens.tstein (New
York: New Press, 1993) 468-474; Ruthann Robson, "Resisting the Family:
Repositioning Lesbians in Legal Theory," Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture
and Society 19 (1994) : 975-996;
6
·

This statement draws from Thompson, Why Can't, the reported case law,
and Fajer.
7
·

For the personal consequences of becoming subject to guardianship, see
Winsor C. Schmidt, Jr., Guardianship: Court ofLast R.esortfor the Elderly and
Disabled (Durham: Carolina Academic 1995) 5-7.
8
·

See "The Tie That Binds," 23 Loyola ofL.A. Law Rev. at 1134-8 for an important discussion of the Kowalski case.
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